How Will A Turbulent Egypt Affect Israeli Foreign Policy?

On January 25, 2011, a series of protests and acts of civil disobedience began to rock Egypt. The day was selected by the April 6 Youth Movement to coincide with the National Police Day holiday, and drew crowds from multiple socioeconomic backgrounds and faiths, ultimately becoming unprecedented in scope. The principal demand was the ousting of the Hosni Mubarak government at the centre that has been in power for the last 30 years, since the assassination of Anwar El Sadat. Sadat was a close confidant of Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser Hosseini, who, alongside Muhammed Naguib, led the 1952 revolution that saw the displacement of British influence in the country and the toppling of the monarchy, and set the foundation stones for Arab nationalism by establishing Egypt as a military-state. After the assassination of Sadat, Hosni Mubarak took over as president of the nation, continuing to preserve the military sovereignty.

[caption id="" align="alignright" width="300" caption="Celebrating the signing of the Camp David Accords, 1979. L to R: Begin, Carter and Sadat"][/caption]

Between 1952 and 1982 (the year of the first Israel-Lebanon War), the foundations of the USA-mediated Israel-Egypt armistice were set, signed by then Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Sadat in 1979, more popularly known as the Camp David Accords. For this, Begin and Sadat received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978. In the shorter term, Israel demilitarized the Sinai peninsula that it had captured during the Six Day War and, in the longer term, it removed Egypt out of the mix of countries that posed a threat to its existence as a nation in the region. Consequently, Israel has fought only two wars (1982 and 2006), both of which concerned Israeli interests and not its survival, which constituted the cause of the wars fought in 1948, 1967 and 1973.

Therefore, it is important to evaluate what lies in Egypt's future at the moment. The majority of the issue has been due to Mubarak's failure to implement a succession plan: the man is old, has been severely ill many times, but there seems to be no effort made to so much as ensure that his son, Gamal, take over from him. The institution of Omar Suleiman as the Vice-president recently could be construed as a step in that direction, perhaps even providing for an able candidate if Mubarak ever steps down in compliance with public demand. However, the silent resurgence of the Muslim Brothers (MB) makes the formation of an Islamist state very much possible, although their muted participation in past political affairs might signal otherwise.

This leaves us with the following possibilities (all of which are guesses, none of which are forecasts):

1. Hosni Mubarak does not step down, intensifying the current situation to an authoritarian threat


2. Another coup of the colonels ensues, a new militarist regime substitutes Mubarak's


3. Mubarak steps down, elections are called for, resulting in an unfortunate political gridlock that leaves no leader at the top


4. Mubarak steps down, elections are called for, resulting in the appointment of someone like El Baradei

The development of the first or second scenario will be closely monitored,e specially by two states that have much at stake: USA and Iran. The USA's presence in the Middle East is primarily strutted by Egyptian support and intelligence, whereas Iran, which has quickly emerged as the radical centre of gravity in the region, will be conscious of the threat another radical state - a competitor. However, it would be utterly unfair to say that the current political crisis has been brought about by "conspiracies" due the USA or Iran.

The third possibility could spell considerable misfortune for the Israeli faction since, in the event of a gridlock, it is not possible to correctly determine who will swing the vote. Even though the Muslim Brothers have been quiet in the past, it would be folly to mistake their caution for weakness, and the current protests could very well present a good opportunity for a stronger resurgence. This scenario also leaves open the possible abrogation of the Camp David Accords and a parallel strengthening of the military. Israel does not have enough forces to invade and occupy Egypt, while the strengthening of the military could impose further costs on the Zionist state.

The development of the fourth scenario does not portend any changes to the geopolitical map since, if El Baradei were to be elected Prime minister, his primary interests would lie with the Egyptian state and the Egyptian people given his secularism and a hopefully domestic perspective on policy framing.

From all of this, it is evident that internal politics in Egypt is just as much a global affair as it is local. Many countries that could be labeled powers or even superpowers have something to gain and something to lose with the going of Hosni Mubarak, which must happen sometime. That it is happening now, after the rebuke Sadat dealt to the USSR and changed his alliance to the USA after 1967, poses threats that include a strategic catastrophe for the USA, the reformation of a Russian alliance and renewed resistance to the Israeli ideology - all in all, an impending redrawing of the world map.