The Philosophy Of Science

Knowledge, by that very term, becomes definite in terms of a point of utility; it has no meaning and remains an abstraction of useful information, as it were, incapable of being recognized as purposeful or even employable. In this context, those of us seeking to demystify any phenomenon for that matter must come up with a model ourselves in order to be able to perform two important and critical tasks: define a definitive theory for ourselves in order to build upwards from it – a footstool to step on to look at what is beyond – and to utilize that model in order to generalize and analogize it in multiple stimulus dimensions.

For example, experimental physicists studying the nature of universe have to presuppose a primitive model of their own – either to establish an assumed conformity or to oppose it – in order to move further; the experiments itself that need to be conducted will have to have a presupposed scientific basis. This mandatory presupposition is the only difference, in my opinion, between different schools of thought and different models of prediction because they are both and all characterized by their own individual structures that were acquired, or generated as are a few cases, depending on the point of departures from the respective parental models. This representation of the modes of acquisition of knowledge and any useful information is infallible in that it is only a matter of the location of the philosophical origin of the theory at hand.

[caption id="" align="aligncenter" width="300" caption=""Doctor Mirabilis" Roger Bacon, a Franciscan friar who placed great emphasis on empirical methods"][/caption]

At this juncture, many scholars are bound down by fundamentalist doctrines that limit the breadth of deduction and resulting thought, which eventually also limit the extent to which the findings of the study can be understood in terms of applicability – and this difficulty only but trickles down to the fact that any information that is not practicable is only text and number.

In subjects that concern psychology, sociolinguistics and the like – those, in other words, associated with the nature of humanity in general – the experimental structure of the fundamental tenets determine the extent to which we are even capable of understanding ourselves. When a scholar germane to this context begins his work on a model of competence (coined by Noam Chomsky) that is defined by primitive natures, the model itself being scientific, there is a propensity towards considering only the methods through which the nature of the system is acquired by others but not the nature of the system itself. This defaulting can be expressed as the restrictions of the scholars in terms of what he or she is practicing to the confines of what they have presupposed and the inability to defeat an innate inculcated inurity.

[caption id="" align="alignright" width="223" caption="Noam Chomsky"][/caption]

Another facet of a constricted model is that of incomplete cognizance: in order to consider this, one must be able to understand how the human mind itself, or the brain in its stead, understands the nature of the world. In a conversation between Chomsky and Mitsou Ronat, the former speaks of the concept of face recognition. When we see a face, we understand the geometrical limits of the shape, the environment it was perceived in and the ascribe it in memory to a person whom we may or may not know. However, the fascination sets in when we look at the same face at a point of time in the future, but from another angle. Now, the geometrical reconstruction required for this sort of thing is immensely complicated, and scholars are still unsure as to whether this ability is inculcated after birth through competitive learning or it is built in into the system. In order to understand this, neurologists and psychoanalysts alike must be able to come up with a model of competence that theorizes, at least hypothetically, as to the capabilities of each hemisphere of the brain.

In this context, an empiricist model will choke back any imminently possible advancements in radical explanations for the phenomenon; this inability amongst thinkers to remain open to newer possibilities has adverse effects in that it delays progress in a direction that welcomes ideas and theories that serve to enhance the competency of their findings, and instead may remain reclusive as regards the applicability of the findings. Science, technology, the arts and the natural sciences all involve hypotheses and theorizations at some level of abstraction or the other, and to bog them down in favor of personal interest over progress of the subject is just intellectual bigotry.

The philosophy of science, per se, does not only include the methods of inquiry that scientific experimentation must espouse but also the end purpose it serves to be the cause of. Just as there exist social and moral responsibility, there exists an indefatigable intellectual responsibility amongst those who can avail the resources required to indulge in their interests, while at the same time showing promising indications of furthering the boundaries of their interests. This responsibility cascades beyond gray matter logistics and into servitude unto the greater good; this greater good I may take the liberty to define as the progress of all mankind in whatsoever direction our intelligence charioteers us in, and not one deterred and altered by individual predilection.

We have a responsibility not only toward the ignorant and unwise, but toward the aware and the wise themselves, too; we have a responsibility not to further ignorance and amusement, but to render the aware more so, to render the wise more so, to render the ignoramus less so.