The law of conservation of meaning

Logic is universal. That is why, irrespective of what I am trying to say, I can say it by first assembling in my mind—for myself—the logical equivalent, or the logical structure, of my statement and then mapping each logical unit to its translational counterpart. These logical units that I speak of are what words are to the language that they constitute: a nuclear encapsulation of some very specific meaning, as though each word is a symbol, a label, which points to a particular quantum of "meaning" which we find necessary to identify so because of its constitutional significance. At the same time, such a discretionary perspective indicates that language, by way of being the "carrier" of logic, must also be an assemblage of symbols and "meaning" for two reasons:

1. To protect the universality of logic, and


2. To be a logical construct in and by itself

The defence of the universality of logic is necessary because, since any logical statement is due absolute expression in any language (and any language must provide for the expression of a logical statement in order to contribute to the mental development of those who use it), there must be semantic preservation. A syntactic preservation is not mandatory for as long as there is that conservation of meaning. Further, if there weren't multiple languages, then one language, X, will have been used as the medium of expression of the same logic—although whether the question of logical preservation across syntactic modalities would have arisen is a matter of conjecture. Therefore, if provisions for the individuation of meaning and the isolability of meaning and syntax weren't in place, the universality of logic would have been non-existent.

Why must language be a logical construct? This is a simpler, albeit more arduous, question to answer, and for that purpose, let us assume that language is a far-from-logical collection of letters and words, and that the existing grammatical rules are weak. Therefore, the immediately impacted faculty is that of syntax, since, with the exclusion of the need for syntactic preservation, and a loss of the grammatical "strength" of the language, there should be no differences between the following two sentences:

"Woman without her man is nothing."

"Woman... without her, man is nothing."

While one may proffer the argument that there is no semantic preservation either, there is no way to dispute the opposite claim that there is, in fact, absolute* semantic preservation: a contradiction (C)! In comparison to the first sentence: the second, by use of the ellipsis ("...") and a comma (","), clearly demarcates the sub-phrase from the central idea, and breaks down the sentence into an understandable subject-verb-object construction, eliminating the possibility of a contradiction whilst displaying an inherent social contract. In conclusion of the example: the cross-medium representation of one logical framework is possible if and only if another logical framework exists in that medium, and, by virtue of the universality of logic, the necessary semantic preservation predicates a set of logical rules for sentence construction.