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Wednesday, 8 June 2011

On constitutional provisions for parliamentary strength - Part I

The Indian Constitution is the governing document of India, and irrespective of any amendments made to its provisions, the said relationship stands, thereby establishing a pedestal upon which the national democratic executive can be founded. If one were to assimilate ground-up the needs that the Constitution must dutifully assess, institutional stability and institutional responsibility represent obvious conclusions.

It must be noted that the primary role of the document is to allow for the existence of a framework upon which the processes associated with finance, property, contracts, etc., find implicit legitimacy and structure, and through such a provision for repair and development, the citizenry is able to repair and/or progress. Therefore, while those humanitarian commissions such as liberty and equality are parallel, neither are causal nor effectual accoutrements of the Constitution.

The bicameral exercise (i.e., by the Parliament and the state legislatures) is based upon the regulation of governmental power according to the three lists that the Constitution enumerates: the Union List, the State List, and the Concurrent List. Subjects such as national defence, foreign policy, and issuance of currency are reserved to the Union List - as is implied - and laws thereunto may be enacted upon only by the Parliament; public order and local governance are dealt with by the State List, while laws thereunto may be enforced by the State government(s); education, transportation and criminal law are a few subjects of the Concurrent List, upon the composition of which both "houses" of power have bearing.

Let us, now, address the nature of politics itself. Polity may broadly be summed up by political representation, through recourse of which the vox populi is integrated into the public policy-making process, and the social contract that predicates the conditional transfer of certain rights of the free man to the governmental body in order to insure the stable and comfortable enjoyment of his life.

However, central to these constructs is the moral duty one must profess to obey any laws, a political obligation that completes the instituted governmental construction. Does it suffice that one assumes citizenship in order to become obedient of the laws of his or her state? The answer, through all the pages of history, as been unanimous in its end but presents no unified theory that quantifies the means through which it may be acquired.

However, be that as it may, the inculcation of that inclusive freedom is hinged upon individual decision-making so that obligations may become duties, i.e., that they may be assumed by the citizenry voluntarily but sanction it with some moral content. It would be safe to say that political obligation is grounded in natural duty of some sort, and not in any legal duty. The law, to note, carries some moral force but does not hold a monopoly over that impetus as may be exemplified by any person who may not be held immoral if he or she is driving a sick friend to the hospital in complete disregard of the lawful speeding limits.

To ensure that the government is completely functional, therefore, it must also be ensured that political obligations become moral bound, albeit not absolutely so. Morality, however, is an unreliable source of political strength (e.g., Hitler).

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