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Thursday, 4 August 2011

Questions on micropolitical subjectivism & frameworks

First off, bounded rationality: this concept I came across in another form in computational linguistics. In the late 19th century, Benjamin Whorf and Edward Sapir put forth their eponymous hypothesis that “the difference in the significance of languages is the difference in the significance of the perceptions of its speakers.” In '57, Chomsky came up with universal grammar: all languages are accompanied by psychological nativism and a poverty of the stimulus.

These rules struck at the heart of the empiricist position of language acquisition. So, by being born with preset capabilities, are we also beset by preset deficiencies that limit the scope of our successes? Here, we come to bounded rationalism as an immediate consequence of the existence of a universal grammar - and perhaps also to Nietzsche's 'Amor fati'. But this is a purely psychosocial argument.

Secondly, structuralism and rationalist theory: here, mathematics avails a solution I've been fond of in the past—John Nash's game theory. Herbert Simon's three steps to arrive at a decision are identification of alternatives, consequences of alternatives, and evaluation of relevance of consequences. All three are modeled on the necessity of a stable system, the condition that finite variables exist, and the condition that only a finite number of consequences are possible. In that case,

  1. Does the macropolitical structure transform into a metastructure when it comes to assessing the symbolism of a micropolitical reality?

  2. What does that entail?

  3. If it doesn't, then is the new mediator subjectivism?

  4. In that case, is the purpose of subjectivist knowledge to reconcile the self-reflexive identity against the backdrop of a macropolitical entity?

  5. Or, is subjective knowledge purely a micropolitical issue?


This, I think, leads to Carnap's question: can ontological questions have objective answers? Here, as an engineer, I'm reminded of metaphysical naturalism as well.

Finally, the question I find most pressing is whether or not it is necessary for us to adopt a framework - a structuralist tool - in the context of which we view this world. For example, consider the statement "The sun rises in the east after it has set in the west." This means that an eastern sunrise follows a western sunset, ergo there's east and west and there's a sun. All these answers are within the framework of the statement.

However, a question like "Is there really a sun?" prompts us to question the validity of the framework itself, thereby asking us to step outside and evaluate it. Now, how do we evaluate it?

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