The 17th conference on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change claims to have invited delegates from all member states of the UN to discuss on and arrive at a consensus toward the future of the Kyoto Protocol, which expires in December next year. However, recent trends amongst participants have shown that the principle negotiating blocks are the USA, the EU and the BRICS nations: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Unfortunately, trends have also shown that no consensus on anything is reached until the last moment of the conference, thanks primarily to the lack of commitment each nation is willing to put up.
The Kyoto Protocol, signed in 1997, put a binding legal agreement upon developed nations (or, as it calls them, “annex 1 nations”) to cut down on their emissions or face UN-imposed sanctions. As frail as the embargoes may themselves sound, most developed nations with the exception of the USA ratified the agreement and began the arduous process of, to use an appropriate mathematical term, “leaning” down. A recent study by The Economist has emerged that shows how Czechoslovakia cut down its emissions by as much as 30 per cent. But that misses the point: the focus has since shifted away from every country to a certain group of countries, each with its own brand of interests.
The successor to the Kyoto Protocol, which will take effect from 2015 onward if it is formulated in 2011 or 2012, will have to accommodate the emissions of developing nations. Before the Kyoto Protocol came into effect, more than half of all global emissions came from developed nations; today, 58 per cent of all emissions are by developing nations. This means that a binding legal agreement will have to lean down the USA, the EU as well as the BRICS bloc, and therein lies the rub.
The USA is willing to accede to such an agreement if the same limits and sanctions are imposed on all countries that ratify it, shirking away from a West-specific clause that will jeopardise its capacity to keep the Chinese, Indian and Brazilian economies in check. India, in turn, has a different concern altogether. The average emissions per capita per annum of an Indian are a mere 1.2 tonnes, and with more than 400 million of its people still living in poverty, India’s needs are more pressing than America’s because its need for development is righteously immense. Therefore, leashing both the USA and India with the same amount of rope makes no sense. However, the prospect of finally leashing the USA has the EU excited, which makes the BRICS’s resistance all the more important, all the more precarious.
Because of the significant unified bargaining power of the BRICS block, the biggest threat it could face is one of its members breaking rank, which the head of the Chinese delegate almost did. On December 6, Mr. Xie Zhenhua announced that China was ready to participate in a treaty that would legally bind both developing and developed nations, an announcement that is sure to have sent a shiver down the convention’s spine. However, before anything radical materialized, Mr. Zhenhua clarified that China was willing to participate in a treaty that would bind only the developed nations even though developing nations would be a part of it.
What is he trying to say? That the developing nations will evaluate the greenhouse gas emissions of the developed nations? Or that China was prepared to break away and form its own bargaining front? Or was it simply a case of reckless overstepping that was quickly mitigated by the realization that China would have nowhere to go from thereon? Greenhouse gases can step aside: it seems a blast of hot, red air demands some attention now.
Showing posts with label COP17. Show all posts
Showing posts with label COP17. Show all posts
Friday, 9 December 2011
Wednesday, 30 November 2011
Afterlife of the Kyoto Protocol: A case of development as currency
The Kyoto Protocol will expire in December, 2012, almost exactly a year from today. Its legal bindings will collapse and remove all restrictions on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions it currently places on the 64 countries that ratified it in 1997.
Then, if an apparently weak conscience can be disregarded, and many believe it can, then the only thing standing in the way of ourselves and a future that is environmentally secure and free from the threat of extreme weather events is the adoption of a self-imposed and self-regulated system. A system that plays its part in ensuring the world as a whole has cut its GHG emissions by 50 per cent in 2050, a system that requires no confidence that other countries at least have the intention of doing the same, a system that faces no legally-backed sanctions if it releases alarming amounts of pollutants into the air.
The inherent comedy is evident.
The one recourse of any appreciable moment remaining to mankind before the Kyoto Protocol dissolves is the COP17 in Durban, South Africa. Being the 17th conference of the 194 countries to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the talks will host 15,000 members of state, mediapersons and other dignitaries to discuss the all too familiar problems before them: the different obligations of the rich and the poor, who is going to help the poor incentivize green growth, conservation of forests and funding for the development of clear energy technology.
[caption id="attachment_20842" align="aligncenter" width="593" caption="A march by locals outside the International Convention Center, Durban, South Africa, where the COP17 is underway. (Image from The Telegraph)"]
[/caption]
Ever since the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997, relations between the United States and the rest of the world have been tense: because the USA did not ratify the protocol, it did not find its emissions capped by an internationally binding agreement that its trading partners had decided to abide by. An important case in point would be between the USA and the duo of India and China.
On January 1, 1989, the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer entered into force with a heartening 196 signatories pledging to phase out and eventually eliminate chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs). It found renewed interest each year for 10 years after it was effected, and in 1999, after the ratification in Beijing, its goals were replaced by the goals of the Kyoto Protocol.
Consequently, an equal amount of interest was expected from national governments in the new protocol. However, because the focus shifted from process regulation to goal regulation, i.e. from the elimination of CFC- and HCFC-emissions to the strict limit on any kinds of emissions overall, the United States decided to give the ratification a skip. At the same time, because it felt obliged due to environmental concerns as such, its government called for a drop in emissions from the international community - especially from India and China - in a hypocritical approach that found scant purchase from all fronts.
While some would believe the justification of such a call pointless and, at worst, irredeemable, it does merit a consideration of the terms of the interface between whatever treaty is fortunate enough to be the successor and the Kyoto Protocol. At first glance, the Protocol fails to take into account that national emissions in 1990, which respectively defines the subsequent cap for each nation, were uneven in various ways. In 1990, East and West Germany unified to become one state after which East Germany's emissions collapsed. Germany, therefore, took the opportunity to take credit for this drop in emissions even though what was West Germany began to step up industrialization. Australia, on a similar vein, had extremely high land clearance rates in 1990, and despite an emerging sentiment in the country to cut back on emissions in the following years, the Protocol in 1997 allowed them an increase. The same goes for Iceland.
[caption id="attachment_20845" align="aligncenter" width="593" caption="Per capita emission in Iceland"]
[/caption]
By not gauging anyone's contribution to the climate change mess based on net current emissions, the Protocol became a proxy for disguised industrialization. As has been mentioned earlier, it completely retrogressed economically powerful beneficiaries like the United States and Canada to a pre-Montreal Protocol stage.
Since the prevailing consensus amongst attendees of the COP17 is that a legally binding agreement will not be reached before 2015, India and China will want to use the interim period to step up industrial growth or, in other words, industrial emissions. In the same span, the United States will look to garner sufficient political support that it currently lacks to curb climate change (this after Obama's cap-and-trade proposal flopped spectacularly in the US Senate in 2010).
One way or another, scientists and researchers believe that things are going in the wrong direction, but at the same time, the expectations of countries such as those of the European Union from the United States seem to pose an unnecessary hindrance in the way of developing countries enforcing their demands on the United States. This, in turn, comes with the reasonable assumption that developing nations should indeed have more of a say in the matter.
For instance, since the sanctions imposed by the Kyoto Protocol in case of failure to comply are weaker than domestic laws in almost all ratifying nations, the EU fears that the US will attempt to take advantage of this leniency. At the same time, India and China, which are expressing some willingness to ratify a successor protocol if the US is willing to, too, face the risk of even tighter regulations of their emissions simply because the sanctions of the successor will be strengthened to leash the US. The question is: is suffering domestic action a parameter for evaluation at all? If anything, a special clause must be put in place instead of attempting to curb sovereign autonomy. Better yet, the developed nations must unite separately before coming to the negotiations desk.
At the end of the day, the principle cause of any problems that have to do with a delay in enforcing a new protocol is the employment of development as currency: with developed countries on one side, developing countries on one and the underdeveloped countries left to campaign for a cause of their own, unity seems hopelessly distant. The solution lies in the primary failure of the Kyoto Protocol: instead of basing future action on historic development, it seems only prudent to base future action on future development. Global trade and other strategically relevant programs must be tied in with processes that work toward curbing climate change so that clean and sustainable energy stands a chance to become the new currency - which is what those at Durban this week are looking for.
If those at COP17 feel that development as currency is a legitimate position to begin with, then negotiations are bound to be doomed. Instead, much hope lies with restructuring development so that it is strutted by environmentalism as a developmental entity and not by environmentalism as a socio-economic entity. Yes, capitalistic ideals will seep in, but the world is seeking to do a volte-face on the past, and that demands a volte-face on our past attitudes as well.
Then, if an apparently weak conscience can be disregarded, and many believe it can, then the only thing standing in the way of ourselves and a future that is environmentally secure and free from the threat of extreme weather events is the adoption of a self-imposed and self-regulated system. A system that plays its part in ensuring the world as a whole has cut its GHG emissions by 50 per cent in 2050, a system that requires no confidence that other countries at least have the intention of doing the same, a system that faces no legally-backed sanctions if it releases alarming amounts of pollutants into the air.
The inherent comedy is evident.
The one recourse of any appreciable moment remaining to mankind before the Kyoto Protocol dissolves is the COP17 in Durban, South Africa. Being the 17th conference of the 194 countries to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the talks will host 15,000 members of state, mediapersons and other dignitaries to discuss the all too familiar problems before them: the different obligations of the rich and the poor, who is going to help the poor incentivize green growth, conservation of forests and funding for the development of clear energy technology.
[caption id="attachment_20842" align="aligncenter" width="593" caption="A march by locals outside the International Convention Center, Durban, South Africa, where the COP17 is underway. (Image from The Telegraph)"]
[/caption]Ever since the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997, relations between the United States and the rest of the world have been tense: because the USA did not ratify the protocol, it did not find its emissions capped by an internationally binding agreement that its trading partners had decided to abide by. An important case in point would be between the USA and the duo of India and China.
On January 1, 1989, the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer entered into force with a heartening 196 signatories pledging to phase out and eventually eliminate chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs). It found renewed interest each year for 10 years after it was effected, and in 1999, after the ratification in Beijing, its goals were replaced by the goals of the Kyoto Protocol.
Consequently, an equal amount of interest was expected from national governments in the new protocol. However, because the focus shifted from process regulation to goal regulation, i.e. from the elimination of CFC- and HCFC-emissions to the strict limit on any kinds of emissions overall, the United States decided to give the ratification a skip. At the same time, because it felt obliged due to environmental concerns as such, its government called for a drop in emissions from the international community - especially from India and China - in a hypocritical approach that found scant purchase from all fronts.
While some would believe the justification of such a call pointless and, at worst, irredeemable, it does merit a consideration of the terms of the interface between whatever treaty is fortunate enough to be the successor and the Kyoto Protocol. At first glance, the Protocol fails to take into account that national emissions in 1990, which respectively defines the subsequent cap for each nation, were uneven in various ways. In 1990, East and West Germany unified to become one state after which East Germany's emissions collapsed. Germany, therefore, took the opportunity to take credit for this drop in emissions even though what was West Germany began to step up industrialization. Australia, on a similar vein, had extremely high land clearance rates in 1990, and despite an emerging sentiment in the country to cut back on emissions in the following years, the Protocol in 1997 allowed them an increase. The same goes for Iceland.
[caption id="attachment_20845" align="aligncenter" width="593" caption="Per capita emission in Iceland"]
[/caption]By not gauging anyone's contribution to the climate change mess based on net current emissions, the Protocol became a proxy for disguised industrialization. As has been mentioned earlier, it completely retrogressed economically powerful beneficiaries like the United States and Canada to a pre-Montreal Protocol stage.
Since the prevailing consensus amongst attendees of the COP17 is that a legally binding agreement will not be reached before 2015, India and China will want to use the interim period to step up industrial growth or, in other words, industrial emissions. In the same span, the United States will look to garner sufficient political support that it currently lacks to curb climate change (this after Obama's cap-and-trade proposal flopped spectacularly in the US Senate in 2010).
One way or another, scientists and researchers believe that things are going in the wrong direction, but at the same time, the expectations of countries such as those of the European Union from the United States seem to pose an unnecessary hindrance in the way of developing countries enforcing their demands on the United States. This, in turn, comes with the reasonable assumption that developing nations should indeed have more of a say in the matter.
For instance, since the sanctions imposed by the Kyoto Protocol in case of failure to comply are weaker than domestic laws in almost all ratifying nations, the EU fears that the US will attempt to take advantage of this leniency. At the same time, India and China, which are expressing some willingness to ratify a successor protocol if the US is willing to, too, face the risk of even tighter regulations of their emissions simply because the sanctions of the successor will be strengthened to leash the US. The question is: is suffering domestic action a parameter for evaluation at all? If anything, a special clause must be put in place instead of attempting to curb sovereign autonomy. Better yet, the developed nations must unite separately before coming to the negotiations desk.
At the end of the day, the principle cause of any problems that have to do with a delay in enforcing a new protocol is the employment of development as currency: with developed countries on one side, developing countries on one and the underdeveloped countries left to campaign for a cause of their own, unity seems hopelessly distant. The solution lies in the primary failure of the Kyoto Protocol: instead of basing future action on historic development, it seems only prudent to base future action on future development. Global trade and other strategically relevant programs must be tied in with processes that work toward curbing climate change so that clean and sustainable energy stands a chance to become the new currency - which is what those at Durban this week are looking for.
If those at COP17 feel that development as currency is a legitimate position to begin with, then negotiations are bound to be doomed. Instead, much hope lies with restructuring development so that it is strutted by environmentalism as a developmental entity and not by environmentalism as a socio-economic entity. Yes, capitalistic ideals will seep in, but the world is seeking to do a volte-face on the past, and that demands a volte-face on our past attitudes as well.
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