What remains to be thought

Is the pursuit of the truth an altruistic objective?— Rand

Does there exist meaning outside of what is constructed through experience—i.e., through man's interaction with reality?

Id est:

Does there exist any truth outside of what is relevant in reality?— constructivism

How is relevance established?

What is the role of verification in establishing relevance?— Ayer

What are the necessary rules/methodologies/procedures that must be followed to conclusively 'verify something?— Popper

What remains to be thought

Is the pursuit of the truth an altruistic objective?— Rand

Does there exist meaning outside of what is constructed through experience—i.e., through man's interaction with reality?

Id est:

Does there exist any truth outside of what is relevant in reality?— constructivism

How is relevance established?

What is the role of verification in establishing relevance?— Ayer

What are the necessary rules/methodologies/procedures that must be followed to conclusively 'verify something?— Popper

Language, truth and knowledge

It would prove futile to address every incidence of curiosity by seeking out the requisite "knowledge" that constitutes the "knowable" volume of the subject through an isolationist perspective; it is also obviously futile to address the content in its entirety lest the curiosity—essentially the context within which any epistemological exegesis becomes meaningful—stands overwhelmed. If I were to associate any semantic weight with the idea of justice, I would ask: where does the knowledge, "the truth", of law arise from, what is the need that, in the eyes of those who partake of its provisions, it assesses, and what is the modality within which it finds realization? Could there exist an epistemological variable the evaluation of which represents a (quantitative or qualitative) difference between the cognitive value of a statement of truth and that of a statement of law, thereby, say, establishing the origin of the truth of law as being independent of the same social urges that are the domain (of applicability) of the sanctions it backs?

Language, truth and knowledge

It would prove futile to address every incidence of curiosity by seeking out the requisite "knowledge" that constitutes the "knowable" volume of the subject through an isolationist perspective; it is also obviously futile to address the content in its entirety lest the curiosity—essentially the context within which any epistemological exegesis becomes meaningful—stands overwhelmed. If I were to associate any semantic weight with the idea of justice, I would ask: where does the knowledge, "the truth", of law arise from, what is the need that, in the eyes of those who partake of its provisions, it assesses, and what is the modality within which it finds realization? Could there exist an epistemological variable the evaluation of which represents a (quantitative or qualitative) difference between the cognitive value of a statement of truth and that of a statement of law, thereby, say, establishing the origin of the truth of law as being independent of the same social urges that are the domain (of applicability) of the sanctions it backs?

Orison of the knowing

Welcome home to this world, this world that makes us;
The world is the land beneath the road that takes us
On the journey we so often seek to undertake
Unto cities of gold where lie the fortunes we must make!

The world is the name of the cross that aches us;
The world is the home of the foe that stakes us;
Here we with memories bury the hatchet of hate
When our golden dreams fall to the ground insatiate!

The world is the hue of the blindness that breaks us;
The world is the shade of turmoil that shakes us;
Only here rests the unseen good of an unseen god
But punishment–oh yes–must be with a firing squad!

Such is the reward of this world that baits us
Guarding our treasure with trying fate it awaits us!
It is no longer the world that once remained our own;
'Tis the sole truth to the ignorant we must make known!