The function of a "unit cell" in the perception lattice

Old post, now archived thus.

--

Beginning from the quantification of perception, we see, hear and feel the objects around us. We understand animation, we derive motion, we negotiate shapes, and we respond to changes. There is nothing to philosophy if only for our ability to become opinionated and a sense of good and bad, whence we also derive judgment and the skills of decision-making. Just as we have left and right to orient us in the physical realm, we have problems and solutions to orient us in the mental realm.

A problem is perceived in its deviation from normality, and in the exposition of abnormality to alert us to one change in particular and in even greater specificity, its incompatibility with normality as we see it. Problems can arise in many forms - as many as we have come to perceive. It is the solution we come to, the one particular decision to alter things as they are and to set them in positions that would resemble in positions they were. We try to reinstate normality as it should be, devoid of anything erroneous, error-prone or error-causing and greatly limitable by one's own actions as they will be.

While walking on a straight road, the need to perceive a change in direction is responded to by taking a perpendicular turn at the most. The sense of left and right, henceforth, seem to more pronounced owing to the presence of an original path that now takes up the first slot in the history of the journey. While travelling on a straight road, without having to take any turns at any points of space and time, the journey consisted of an abode and destination separated by a distance consisting solely of linear displacements; in other words, there was a problem, and there was only one feasible solution.

But once you have taken a turn, say to the right, then you have an angularity associated with your journey: you have reoriented yourself, and analogously, you have altered your direction in favour of a new solution to the same problem. The presence of an original plays an important role in that it gives rise to comparative decision-making, and a variety of opinions with significant variations between them.

The traversal of a straight road gives rise to no such notions because of its inherent inability to deliver comparability. And this is where a theory of nothing, which is only a set of some questions that seem to answer themselves at first, is born. Man’s natural need to quantify the objects, changes and adaptations around him is only understandable. Only with quantification comes perception. This is because, at the most fundamental of levels, the changes around us are used to keep track of time. When an object moves from point A to point B, it marks a change of position and gives rise to displacement. Therefore, the quantification of the phenomena around us empowers us with the tool of recollection, which can be put to immense use when we use comparative decision-making.

The same problem may have given rise to multiple solutions, but when a problem with only one possible solution occurs repeatedly, the problem can be filed away as a one-time occurrence and the solutions that were used previously to tackle it can be thought of as multiple and, therefore, employed again. This concept, in its turn, brings us to the breakdown of time into logically similar categories. When you leave your home for work, the morning may be divided as:

1. You at home,


2. You while driving, and


3. You at work.

By the logical organization of time periods, alternatively ‘time spans’, you find a sense of progress. When the same tasks are performed on a fairly regular basis, the scenario transforms into a routine and the requirement of a logical categorization becomes suppressed by the commoditized grouping of these tasks into blocks characterized by the observation of relatively progressive changes in a parallel walk of life.

For example, when you work at the office, you perform the tasks assigned to you (as conforming to a division of labour). However, the progress is observed in your personal life when you earn money, and in your employer’s business, which seems to want you to work efficiently for it to profit from the collective efficiency. Subsequently, an instance of multiparallelism can be drawn out between all such cases of analogous systems.

In the said cases, quantification has been observed only because it was being looked for; what about when one desires quantification in some other region of perception but is unable to find it? Does that mean that what one perceives is nonexistent? That is absurd because the validity of my perception is then annulled!

In trying to come to terms with change and the relativity of existence itself, we have subconsciously but inevitably generated the need for quantification. But of course, the coexistent fundamentality of the very notion is an excuse enough and has, therefore, qualified itself as a positive sign of progress.

Our understanding of the people and social machinery around us only deepens our faith in the social pedestal upon which we stand, and thereby also increases our commitment to the understanding of other parallel phenomena. So, pre-quantification, we have change, orientation, progress, and some parameters with which we are enabled to measure them. If these parameters were to be absent one at a time, then the ease of quantification becomes reduced, but on the other hand, even the presence of one of these parameters at times becomes a cause for problem. It is the combination of them that may possess any expectations of standing true.

However, when something as abstract as any other fundamental elemental constituent of logic, like logic itself, is subjugated to the detection of such parameters and the establishment of quantified judgment becomes very complicated owing to logically overriding incompatibilities. Therefore, in dealing with such terms with immense applications in reasoning, we have to define the most fundamental of these terms such that those incompatibilities arising out of hierarchal disturbances in the logical structure of reasoning itself are not dealt with.

In other words, we have to define the smallest units of existence which posses the least amount of elemental reasonability and, therefore, can be parallelized to arrive at a logical conclusion to any statement or problem.

The function of a "unit cell" in the perception lattice

Old post, now archived thus.

--

Beginning from the quantification of perception, we see, hear and feel the objects around us. We understand animation, we derive motion, we negotiate shapes, and we respond to changes. There is nothing to philosophy if only for our ability to become opinionated and a sense of good and bad, whence we also derive judgment and the skills of decision-making. Just as we have left and right to orient us in the physical realm, we have problems and solutions to orient us in the mental realm.

A problem is perceived in its deviation from normality, and in the exposition of abnormality to alert us to one change in particular and in even greater specificity, its incompatibility with normality as we see it. Problems can arise in many forms - as many as we have come to perceive. It is the solution we come to, the one particular decision to alter things as they are and to set them in positions that would resemble in positions they were. We try to reinstate normality as it should be, devoid of anything erroneous, error-prone or error-causing and greatly limitable by one's own actions as they will be.

While walking on a straight road, the need to perceive a change in direction is responded to by taking a perpendicular turn at the most. The sense of left and right, henceforth, seem to more pronounced owing to the presence of an original path that now takes up the first slot in the history of the journey. While travelling on a straight road, without having to take any turns at any points of space and time, the journey consisted of an abode and destination separated by a distance consisting solely of linear displacements; in other words, there was a problem, and there was only one feasible solution.

But once you have taken a turn, say to the right, then you have an angularity associated with your journey: you have reoriented yourself, and analogously, you have altered your direction in favour of a new solution to the same problem. The presence of an original plays an important role in that it gives rise to comparative decision-making, and a variety of opinions with significant variations between them.

The traversal of a straight road gives rise to no such notions because of its inherent inability to deliver comparability. And this is where a theory of nothing, which is only a set of some questions that seem to answer themselves at first, is born. Man’s natural need to quantify the objects, changes and adaptations around him is only understandable. Only with quantification comes perception. This is because, at the most fundamental of levels, the changes around us are used to keep track of time. When an object moves from point A to point B, it marks a change of position and gives rise to displacement. Therefore, the quantification of the phenomena around us empowers us with the tool of recollection, which can be put to immense use when we use comparative decision-making.

The same problem may have given rise to multiple solutions, but when a problem with only one possible solution occurs repeatedly, the problem can be filed away as a one-time occurrence and the solutions that were used previously to tackle it can be thought of as multiple and, therefore, employed again. This concept, in its turn, brings us to the breakdown of time into logically similar categories. When you leave your home for work, the morning may be divided as:

1. You at home,


2. You while driving, and


3. You at work.

By the logical organization of time periods, alternatively ‘time spans’, you find a sense of progress. When the same tasks are performed on a fairly regular basis, the scenario transforms into a routine and the requirement of a logical categorization becomes suppressed by the commoditized grouping of these tasks into blocks characterized by the observation of relatively progressive changes in a parallel walk of life.

For example, when you work at the office, you perform the tasks assigned to you (as conforming to a division of labour). However, the progress is observed in your personal life when you earn money, and in your employer’s business, which seems to want you to work efficiently for it to profit from the collective efficiency. Subsequently, an instance of multiparallelism can be drawn out between all such cases of analogous systems.

In the said cases, quantification has been observed only because it was being looked for; what about when one desires quantification in some other region of perception but is unable to find it? Does that mean that what one perceives is nonexistent? That is absurd because the validity of my perception is then annulled!

In trying to come to terms with change and the relativity of existence itself, we have subconsciously but inevitably generated the need for quantification. But of course, the coexistent fundamentality of the very notion is an excuse enough and has, therefore, qualified itself as a positive sign of progress.

Our understanding of the people and social machinery around us only deepens our faith in the social pedestal upon which we stand, and thereby also increases our commitment to the understanding of other parallel phenomena. So, pre-quantification, we have change, orientation, progress, and some parameters with which we are enabled to measure them. If these parameters were to be absent one at a time, then the ease of quantification becomes reduced, but on the other hand, even the presence of one of these parameters at times becomes a cause for problem. It is the combination of them that may possess any expectations of standing true.

However, when something as abstract as any other fundamental elemental constituent of logic, like logic itself, is subjugated to the detection of such parameters and the establishment of quantified judgment becomes very complicated owing to logically overriding incompatibilities. Therefore, in dealing with such terms with immense applications in reasoning, we have to define the most fundamental of these terms such that those incompatibilities arising out of hierarchal disturbances in the logical structure of reasoning itself are not dealt with.

In other words, we have to define the smallest units of existence which posses the least amount of elemental reasonability and, therefore, can be parallelized to arrive at a logical conclusion to any statement or problem.

The function of a "unit cell" in the perception lattice

Old post, now archived thus.

--

Beginning from the quantification of perception, we see, hear and feel the objects around us. We understand animation, we derive motion, we negotiate shapes, and we respond to changes. There is nothing to philosophy if only for our ability to become opinionated and a sense of good and bad, whence we also derive judgment and the skills of decision-making. Just as we have left and right to orient us in the physical realm, we have problems and solutions to orient us in the mental realm.

A problem is perceived in its deviation from normality, and in the exposition of abnormality to alert us to one change in particular and in even greater specificity, its incompatibility with normality as we see it. Problems can arise in many forms - as many as we have come to perceive. It is the solution we come to, the one particular decision to alter things as they are and to set them in positions that would resemble in positions they were. We try to reinstate normality as it should be, devoid of anything erroneous, error-prone or error-causing and greatly limitable by one's own actions as they will be.

While walking on a straight road, the need to perceive a change in direction is responded to by taking a perpendicular turn at the most. The sense of left and right, henceforth, seem to more pronounced owing to the presence of an original path that now takes up the first slot in the history of the journey. While travelling on a straight road, without having to take any turns at any points of space and time, the journey consisted of an abode and destination separated by a distance consisting solely of linear displacements; in other words, there was a problem, and there was only one feasible solution.

But once you have taken a turn, say to the right, then you have an angularity associated with your journey: you have reoriented yourself, and analogously, you have altered your direction in favour of a new solution to the same problem. The presence of an original plays an important role in that it gives rise to comparative decision-making, and a variety of opinions with significant variations between them.

The traversal of a straight road gives rise to no such notions because of its inherent inability to deliver comparability. And this is where a theory of nothing, which is only a set of some questions that seem to answer themselves at first, is born. Man’s natural need to quantify the objects, changes and adaptations around him is only understandable. Only with quantification comes perception. This is because, at the most fundamental of levels, the changes around us are used to keep track of time. When an object moves from point A to point B, it marks a change of position and gives rise to displacement. Therefore, the quantification of the phenomena around us empowers us with the tool of recollection, which can be put to immense use when we use comparative decision-making.

The same problem may have given rise to multiple solutions, but when a problem with only one possible solution occurs repeatedly, the problem can be filed away as a one-time occurrence and the solutions that were used previously to tackle it can be thought of as multiple and, therefore, employed again. This concept, in its turn, brings us to the breakdown of time into logically similar categories. When you leave your home for work, the morning may be divided as:

1. You at home,


2. You while driving, and


3. You at work.

By the logical organization of time periods, alternatively ‘time spans’, you find a sense of progress. When the same tasks are performed on a fairly regular basis, the scenario transforms into a routine and the requirement of a logical categorization becomes suppressed by the commoditized grouping of these tasks into blocks characterized by the observation of relatively progressive changes in a parallel walk of life.

For example, when you work at the office, you perform the tasks assigned to you (as conforming to a division of labour). However, the progress is observed in your personal life when you earn money, and in your employer’s business, which seems to want you to work efficiently for it to profit from the collective efficiency. Subsequently, an instance of multiparallelism can be drawn out between all such cases of analogous systems.

In the said cases, quantification has been observed only because it was being looked for; what about when one desires quantification in some other region of perception but is unable to find it? Does that mean that what one perceives is nonexistent? That is absurd because the validity of my perception is then annulled!

In trying to come to terms with change and the relativity of existence itself, we have subconsciously but inevitably generated the need for quantification. But of course, the coexistent fundamentality of the very notion is an excuse enough and has, therefore, qualified itself as a positive sign of progress.

Our understanding of the people and social machinery around us only deepens our faith in the social pedestal upon which we stand, and thereby also increases our commitment to the understanding of other parallel phenomena. So, pre-quantification, we have change, orientation, progress, and some parameters with which we are enabled to measure them. If these parameters were to be absent one at a time, then the ease of quantification becomes reduced, but on the other hand, even the presence of one of these parameters at times becomes a cause for problem. It is the combination of them that may possess any expectations of standing true.

However, when something as abstract as any other fundamental elemental constituent of logic, like logic itself, is subjugated to the detection of such parameters and the establishment of quantified judgment becomes very complicated owing to logically overriding incompatibilities. Therefore, in dealing with such terms with immense applications in reasoning, we have to define the most fundamental of these terms such that those incompatibilities arising out of hierarchal disturbances in the logical structure of reasoning itself are not dealt with.

In other words, we have to define the smallest units of existence which posses the least amount of elemental reasonability and, therefore, can be parallelized to arrive at a logical conclusion to any statement or problem.

Philosophy and the scientific method

Philosophy's widely been called the classification of thoughts; although that seems like a simple definition, those requirements in place to ensure that it is also accessible to the principles of scientific enquiry make it a daunting and esoteric subject to pursue. While intriguing challenges central to the human nature are presented in no small numbers along the way, the latter quality has prevented it from embraced by the masses as another context within which to investigate the Universe.

At the core of the philosophical argument lies its ability to define principles—any principles—which are, in turn, what enable the classification of thoughts. Would that the Universe contained all of its information as a garble of colours and noise, the process of learning would've been substituted by the process of discovery entirely. However, the case has been demonstrably polar: there are patterns everywhere, patterns that show a remarkable similitude to each other in that they are all principled, in that they all display characteristics of endurance and not grant any incidents of epistemological construction the misfortune of stagnation as structures of the past.This is one of the foremost reasons that inquiry into these matters has proved crucial for social, economic and political progress irrespective of "germane concerns" such as ethnicity, culture or racial history.

In order to both discover and establish (or, recognise and understand) such a replicable ontology, an underlying experimental process is necessary that abides by the principles of scientific investigation and, essentially, empiricism so as to prevent the case of reductio ad absurdum as well as to be able to verify the credibility of any hypothesis without interfering with its functions.

Philosophy and the scientific method

Philosophy's widely been called the classification of thoughts; although that seems like a simple definition, those requirements in place to ensure that it is also accessible to the principles of scientific enquiry make it a daunting and esoteric subject to pursue. While intriguing challenges central to the human nature are presented in no small numbers along the way, the latter quality has prevented it from embraced by the masses as another context within which to investigate the Universe.

At the core of the philosophical argument lies its ability to define principles—any principles—which are, in turn, what enable the classification of thoughts. Would that the Universe contained all of its information as a garble of colours and noise, the process of learning would've been substituted by the process of discovery entirely. However, the case has been demonstrably polar: there are patterns everywhere, patterns that show a remarkable similitude to each other in that they are all principled, in that they all display characteristics of endurance and not grant any incidents of epistemological construction the misfortune of stagnation as structures of the past.This is one of the foremost reasons that inquiry into these matters has proved crucial for social, economic and political progress irrespective of "germane concerns" such as ethnicity, culture or racial history.

In order to both discover and establish (or, recognise and understand) such a replicable ontology, an underlying experimental process is necessary that abides by the principles of scientific investigation and, essentially, empiricism so as to prevent the case of reductio ad absurdum as well as to be able to verify the credibility of any hypothesis without interfering with its functions.

Language, truth and knowledge

It would prove futile to address every incidence of curiosity by seeking out the requisite "knowledge" that constitutes the "knowable" volume of the subject through an isolationist perspective; it is also obviously futile to address the content in its entirety lest the curiosity—essentially the context within which any epistemological exegesis becomes meaningful—stands overwhelmed. If I were to associate any semantic weight with the idea of justice, I would ask: where does the knowledge, "the truth", of law arise from, what is the need that, in the eyes of those who partake of its provisions, it assesses, and what is the modality within which it finds realization? Could there exist an epistemological variable the evaluation of which represents a (quantitative or qualitative) difference between the cognitive value of a statement of truth and that of a statement of law, thereby, say, establishing the origin of the truth of law as being independent of the same social urges that are the domain (of applicability) of the sanctions it backs?

Language, truth and knowledge

It would prove futile to address every incidence of curiosity by seeking out the requisite "knowledge" that constitutes the "knowable" volume of the subject through an isolationist perspective; it is also obviously futile to address the content in its entirety lest the curiosity—essentially the context within which any epistemological exegesis becomes meaningful—stands overwhelmed. If I were to associate any semantic weight with the idea of justice, I would ask: where does the knowledge, "the truth", of law arise from, what is the need that, in the eyes of those who partake of its provisions, it assesses, and what is the modality within which it finds realization? Could there exist an epistemological variable the evaluation of which represents a (quantitative or qualitative) difference between the cognitive value of a statement of truth and that of a statement of law, thereby, say, establishing the origin of the truth of law as being independent of the same social urges that are the domain (of applicability) of the sanctions it backs?

On investigative journalism

Investigative journalism—investigations are initiated as a matter of personal conviction—responsible exercising of personal judgment required—practice of zero-interference methodologies—participation necessitates agreement with and understanding of policies that define the need—knowledge of what is right, what is wrong—is personal involvement necessary?—mandatory elimination of speculative convictions—investigation must not NECESSITATE the investigation

*

Scenario I

[caption id="attachment_3653" align="aligncenter" width="734" caption="Scenario I - Investigation timeline vs. probability of occurrence of event vs. timeline of event"][/caption]

Conclusion of phase 5 of investigation: direct reporting

Conclusion of phase 4 of investigation: reporting predictions

Conclusion of phase 3 of investigation: investigative reporting

*

Scenario II

[caption id="attachment_3654" align="aligncenter" width="734" caption="Scenario II - Probability of occurrence of event vs. timeline of event"][/caption]

Dotted line: projected probability of event as a result of interferential investigation

*

Scenario III

[caption id="attachment_3655" align="aligncenter" width="734" caption="Scenario III - Probability of occurrence of event vs. timeline of event"][/caption]

Dotted line A: projected, and increased, probability of event as a result of interferential investigation

Dotted line B: projected, and decreased, probability of event as a result of interferential investigation

*

Conference of ethical value—moral value of personal judgment—what if P(ethical val. of B > ethical val. of A) = P(ethical val. of A > ethical val. of B)?—non-interferential investigation takes precedence takes overall precedence when ethical values of A and B are fuzzy—does lesser fuzziness validate interference?

On investigative journalism

Investigative journalism—investigations are initiated as a matter of personal conviction—responsible exercising of personal judgment required—practice of zero-interference methodologies—participation necessitates agreement with and understanding of policies that define the need—knowledge of what is right, what is wrong—is personal involvement necessary?—mandatory elimination of speculative convictions—investigation must not NECESSITATE the investigation

*

Scenario I

[caption id="attachment_3653" align="aligncenter" width="734" caption="Scenario I - Investigation timeline vs. probability of occurrence of event vs. timeline of event"][/caption]

Conclusion of phase 5 of investigation: direct reporting

Conclusion of phase 4 of investigation: reporting predictions

Conclusion of phase 3 of investigation: investigative reporting

*

Scenario II

[caption id="attachment_3654" align="aligncenter" width="734" caption="Scenario II - Probability of occurrence of event vs. timeline of event"][/caption]

Dotted line: projected probability of event as a result of interferential investigation

*

Scenario III

[caption id="attachment_3655" align="aligncenter" width="734" caption="Scenario III - Probability of occurrence of event vs. timeline of event"][/caption]

Dotted line A: projected, and increased, probability of event as a result of interferential investigation

Dotted line B: projected, and decreased, probability of event as a result of interferential investigation

*

Conference of ethical value—moral value of personal judgment—what if P(ethical val. of B > ethical val. of A) = P(ethical val. of A > ethical val. of B)?—non-interferential investigation takes precedence takes overall precedence when ethical values of A and B are fuzzy—does lesser fuzziness validate interference?